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INTRODUCTION

Except for two spiny anteater species found in New Guinea and
Australia, the duck-billed platypus is the only mammal that can lay an
egg.' This makes the duck-billed platypus a strange creation. Likewise, the doctrine of willful patent infringement, as it relates to defending willfulness, is also a strange creation that lays an egg. It is
strange because the jury typically determines whether a defendant's
infringement is willful, 2 but the jury does not determine the amount of
increased damages that may be awarded due to the willful conduct 3resulting in a hard-to-classify legal and equitable hybrid for purposes
of the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. An egg is laid because the doctrine of willful infringement generally requires that a defendant use an advice of counsel defense against the claim of willful
patent infringement, resulting in at least a partial waiver of the attorney-client privilege and possibly a waiver of attorney work-product
immunity.4 Discovery of evidence relating to the defendant's communication with counsel concerning possible infringement may prejudice
the jury and increase the probability of an infringement finding.' On
the other hand, if the defendant does not assert an advice of counsel
defense, juries are currently permitted to draw a negative inference
that willful patent infringement was indeed committed, increasing the
probability of an award of treble damages.6 Therefore, the defendant
has a real problem.
A potential solution to this problem would be to take willfulness
away from the jury, a position taken by some courts and commentators.7 Even upon a timely request for a jury trial, under this approach,
both the determination of willfulness and the determination of the
amount of increased damages would be reserved for the judge. The
most beneficial result would be certainty: allowing defendants and
their attorneys to communicate openly and honestly about the defendants' conduct, knowing that during jury trials on infringement liability,
the attorney-client privilege would remain intact, and juries would not
be prejudiced by evidence relating to willfulness.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Mammal, MICROsoFr ENCARTA ENCYCLOPEDIA (CD-ROM 2000).
See infra Part II.
See infra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 36-65 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
See generally 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000).
See infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
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This solution is sound as long as there is no Seventh Amendment
right to a jury trial on willfulness in patent infringement suits. 8 Although the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the court with
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over patent cases,9 has not answered
this constitutional question,' several courts and commentators have
expressly rejected this theory.1 ' Those courts and commentators are
probably incorrect. Separate analyses, using the Seventh Amendment
jurisprudence and the Federal Circuit court opinions discussing willful
patent infringement, both independently show that the right to a jury
trial on willfulness does indeed exist. However, statutory preclusion
shows that the right to a jury trial does not exist as to the amount of
increased damages to be awarded due to a willfulness finding.' 2
Part II of this Comment provides a brief background of jury trials in
patent infringement suits. Part III explains why the right to a jury trial
on willfulness is important. Part IV shows why the right exists by examining the results of the Seventh Amendment "historical test." Part
V discusses the Federal Circuit's implicit recognition of the right to a
jury trial on willfulness. Accordingly, Part VI shows why the right to a
jury trial on the amount of increased damages does not exist. 1 3 Part
VII presents recommendations in light of the existence and nonexistence of these rights, respectively.

II.

JURY TRIALS IN PATENT INFRINGEMENT SUITS AND FOR
INCREASED DAMAGES

Jury trials in patent infringement suits have increased dramatically.1 4 The percentage of patent infringement suits tried to a jury in
1961, 1981, and 1994, were 0%, 21%, and 70%, respectively. 1 5 In a
patent infringement suit, the relevant patent claims are first construed,
and then infringement liability is determined based on the claim construction. 1 6 In recent years, the proper roles of judges and juries in
these actions have been discussed in litigation 17 and commentary, 8
with it now being well-settled that claim construction is a matter of
8. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. VII.

9. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2000); see also id. § 1338.
10. See infra note 65.

11. See infra notes 184-232 and accompanying text.
12. See 35 U.S.C. § 284.
13. See infra Parts IV. & V.
14. Allan N. Littman, The Jury's Role in Determining Key Issues in Patent Cases:

Markman, Hilton Davis and Beyond, 37 IDEA 207, 209 (1997).
15. See id. at 208-09; see also HERBERT F. SCHWARTZ, PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE § 9.1, at 212-13 (3d ed. 2001) (providing a summary of the percentage of patent
cases tried to a jury from 1975 to 1999).
16. See, e.g., DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 830, 839 (2d
ed. 2001).
17. See generally, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed.
Cir. 1995), affd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (discussing the roles of the judge and jury regarding claim construction and infringement); Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner Jen-
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law for the trial judge, while infringement liability is a fact determination for the jury.19
Regarding damages, the role of the jury is very clear in some issues
and not so clear in others. The current statutory provision for damages in patent infringement cases is 35 U.S.C. § 284, which provides
that "[w]hen the damages are not found by a jury, the court shall assess them. In either event the court may increase the damages up to
three times the amount found or assessed." '2° If the case is tried to a
jury, the jury determines actual (or compensatory) damages. 2 1 How-

ever, in regard to increased damages, the role of the judge and jury is
not completely clear, because a finding of willful infringement is the
most common basis for increased damages. 22 Thus, after patent infringement has been found, two determinations are generally necessary before an award of increased (or enhanced) damages can be

made: (1) whether the infringement was willful, and if so, (2) the
amount of increased damages.2 3 However, the true issue is whether

the trial judge or the jury makes both, one, or none of these
determinations.
Regarding the amount of increased damages, there does not appear

to be much conflict in either the commentary or the common law with
respect to the trial judge determining the amount of the increased
damages.2 4 In contrast, conflict does exist as to whether the judge or
jury determines if increased damages should be awarded; that is,
kinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir. 1995), rev'd, 520 U.S. 17 (1997) (discussing the
roles of the judge and jury regarding the doctrine of equivalents).
18. See generally, e.g., Littman, supra note 14; Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries,
and Patent Cases-An Empirical Look Inside the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REv. 365
(2000).
19. See, e.g., Markman, 517 U.S. at 384, 388.
20. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000).
21. See id.; see also, e.g., Unisplay, S.A. v. Am. Elec. Sign Co., 69 F.3d 512, 517
(Fed. Cir. 1995).
22. See 7 DONALD S.CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 20.03[4][b], at 20-332 & n.87
(1999); see also Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("[T]his
court has approved such awards where the infringer acted in wanton disregard of the
patentee's patent rights, that is, where the infringement is willful."), abrogated in part
on other grounds by Markman, 52 F.3d at 975; Beatrice Foods Co. v. New Eng. Printing & Lithographing Co., 923 F.2d 1576, 1578-80 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("Under our cases,
enhanced damages may be awarded only as a penalty for an infringer's increased
culpability, namely willful infringement or bad faith.").
23. See Shiley, Inc. v. Bentley Labs., Inc., 794 F.2d 1561, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
24. See 7 CHISUM, supra note 22, § 20.03[4][b][vii], at 20-452 to 20-459. In contrast
to addressing the conflict over the role of the judge or the jury in determining willfulness and whether a jury finding is advisory, Professor Chisum does not explicitly address the existence of a conflict over which entity determines the amount of increased
damages in the text of his treatise, nor does he use See, Cf., or But see signals in the
footnotes to implicitly address a conflict. See id. at 20-452 to 20-458. However, after a
survey, one commentator suggests that determining the amount of the increase is
within the proper role of the jury. See Louis L. Wu, Comment, Enhanced Damages
for Willful Patent Infringement-An Issue for Judge or Jury?, 33 U.S.F. L. REV. 435,
452-53 (1999).
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whether the judge or jury is the proper finder of willfulness. 25 Even if

a jury does find willfulness, the courts are divided as to whether this
finding is only advisory to the trial judge.2 6
III.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL
ON WILLFULNESS

At first glance, there may not appear to be much conflict over
whether the jury or the trial judge determines willfulness, because the
amount of increased damages is still within the discretion of the trial
judge.2 ' The only way a jury's finding on willfulness affects the trial
judge is if the jury does not find willfulness.28 If this occurs, the trial
judge cannot increase damages by any amount without a motion for a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 29 However, the question of
whether the right to a jury trial exists on willfulness is important primarily because there is: (1) a conflict in the courts regarding this issue;
and (2) an erosion of the attorney-client privilege and attorney workproduct immunity.
A.

Conflict in the Courts

First, the determination of willfulness by the trial judge or the jury
is important because there is a conflict in the courts as to whether the
right to a jury trial on willfulness exists. Some district courts have
expressly denied the right, stating that "there is no constitutional right
25. Cases holding that the jury should not be the finder of willfulness include Laitram Corp. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 791 F. Supp. 113, 116 (E.D. La. 1992) ("It is wellsettled that the issue of whether a defendant is liable for increased damages because it
willfully infringed a patent is determined by the judge and not the jury."); Slater Electric, Inc. v. Indian Head, Inc., 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 729, 730 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) ("This
language [of § 284] has been construed as reserving the question of increased damages for the Court alone."); Smith v. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co., 538 F. Supp. 977,
986 (D. Del. 1982) ("Treble damages in patent cases, however, are not determined by
the jury, but are determined solely by the Court. The damage jury cannot award
treble damages and thereby will not need to hear those facts surrounding the liability
issue.") (citations omitted). Cases holding that the jury should be the finder of willfulness include Patent Holding Co. v. TG (USA) Corp., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1566,
1567 (E.D. Mich. 1998) ("[T]he issue of willfulness is a question of fact for the jury
and not one of law."); and National Presto Industries, Inc. v. West Bend Co., 76 F.3d
1185, 1193 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("The issue of willful infringement remains with the trier
of fact.").
26. See, e.g., 7 CHISUM, supra note 22, § 20.03[4][b][vii], at 20-452 & n.358 (providing different positions on advisory opinions). Whether a jury finding on willfulness is
merely advisory is very important with regard to determining whether a right to a jury
trial on willfulness exists. See infra Part V.A.
27. See infra Part VI.
28. See Shiley, 794 F.2d at 1568.
29. See id.; see also Modine Mfg. Co. v. Allen Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 538, 543 (Fed.
Cir. 1990). However, one recent case also suggests that if a trial judge expressly contradicts the jury's finding and uses the rejection of the jury's finding as the reason for
not increasing damages, then that is an abuse of discretion. See Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd.,
80 F.3d 1566, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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to a jury trial on issues under ... § 284 ' ' 3 ° and "[willfulness] is not a
matter in which the Plaintiff has a Seventh Amendment right to a jury
trial."3 In addition to those district court holdings, the Fifth Circuit
has also denied that the right exists.32 However, other district courts
have implied, yet have not expressly stated, that there is a right to a
jury determination, holding that "[a] finding of willful infringement is
' 33 Because the
. . clearly within the decisional domain of the jury.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has not resolved this issue,3 4
the conflict can lead to unpredictability in litigation and affect all interested parties, especially in light of the possible threat (or windfall)
of treble damages.3
*

B.

Erosion of the Attorney-Client Privilege and Attorney WorkProduct Immunity

Second, the determination of whether there is a right to a jury trial
on willfulness is important because two rules regarding willful patent
infringement presently erode the attorney-client privilege3 6 and attorney work-product immunity.37 These two rules are the affirmative
duty rule and the negative inference rule.3 8
As first articulated by the Federal Circuit in Underwater Devices,
Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co.," the affirmative duty rule requires that
30. Avia Group Int'l v. Nike, Inc., 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1475, 1477 (D. Or. 1991)
(citing Swofford v. B & W, Inc., 336 F.2d 406, 411-14 (5th Cir. 1975); White v. MarBel, Inc., 509 F.2d 287, 292 (5th Cir. 1975)).
31. Transmatic, Inc. v. Gulton Indus., Inc., 835 F. Supp. 1026, 1032 (E.D. Mich.
1993) ("It makes absolutely no sense to this Court to have to be bound by a jury
verdict [on willfulness] when the Court has already determined that no right to a jury
trial exists on the basic issues in this case."), affd in part, rev'd in part, 53 F.3d 1270
(Fed. Cir. 1995); see also Transmatic, 53 F.3d at 1279 (commenting on the district
court's holding, the Federal Circuit stated that "[t]he district court also held that, even
assuming Transmatic's objection to a bench trial was timely, Transmatic had no right
under the Seventh Amendment to a jury trial on any of the issues remaining in the
case, namely . . . willfulness").
32. See Swofford, 336 F.2d at 412 ("[W]e find no authority for the proposition that
the parties enjoyed a constitutional right to jury trial on the award and amount of
exemplary damages.").
33. See, e.g., Nunes v. Bishop Aviation, Inc., 703 F. Supp. 774, 776 (W.D. Ark.
1988) (reasoning that a "finding of willful infringement is a finding of fact").
34. See Transmatic, 53 F.3d at 1279 (stating that the district court "held ... [the
plaintiff] had no right under the Seventh Amendment to a jury trial on any of the
In view of the court's
issues remaining in the case . .. [including] willfulness ....
correct conclusion that [the plaintiff] waived its right to a jury trial, we need not reach
the court's alternative holding") (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
35. See generally 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000).
36. See Matthew D. Powers & Steven C. Carlson, The Evolution and Impact of the
Doctrine of Willful PatentInfringement, 51 SYRACUSE L. REV. 53, 86-87 (2001) (citing
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1980)); see also FED. R. EVID. 501.
37. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); Powers & Carlson, supra note 36, at 89-91 (citing
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11 (1947)).
38. See Powers & Carlson, supra note 36, at 108.
39. 717 F.2d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
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when "a potential infringer has actual notice of another's patent
rights, he has an affirmative duty to exercise due care to determine
whether or not he is infringing."4 This duty "includes, inter alia, the
duty to seek and obtain competent legal advice from counsel before
the initiation of any possible infringing activity."4 1
Building upon the affirmative duty rule, the Federal Circuit subsequently expressed the negative inference rule, which permits a negative inference to be drawn against the infringer if the infringer's
record is "devoid of opinions of counsel and silent on [the infringer's]
reaction to the existence of the ... patents."42 In other words, unless
the accused infringing party introduces an infringement opinion letter
by counsel, the fact-finder may infer that willful patent infringement
was committed.4 3
The affirmative duty and negative inference rules induce the defendant accused of willful infringement to assert an advice of counsel defense.4 4 This is an affirmative defense where the defendant asserts
that he acted in good faith on the advice of counsel, believing that
either his conduct did not amount to infringement or that the patent
at issue was invalid.4 5 This defense requires that the defendant must
have already communicated with his attorney about whether he may
be found liable for infringement, which therefore results in the possible erosion of the attorney-client privilege and the attorney workproduct immunity.4 6
With respect to the attorney-client privilege, it seems clear that the
privilege is only waived as to attorney-client communication concerning the potential infringement. 47 However, with regard to attorney
work-product immunity, there is disagreement among the district
courts as to whether a defense attorney's work-product is discoverable
after a defendant has asserted a good-faith defense to willful infringement based on advice of counsel. 4' Nevertheless, several courts have
40. See id. at 1389 (citing Milgo Elec. Corp. v. United Bus. Communications, Inc.,
623 F.2d 645, 666 (10th Cir. 1980)).
41. Id. at 1390 (citing Gen. Elec. v. Sciaky Bros., 415 F.2d 1068, 1073-74 (6th Cir.
1969); Marvel Specialty Co. v. Bell Hosiery Mills, Inc., 386 F.2d 287, 289 (4th Cir.
1967)).
42. See Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co., 758 F.2d 613, 628
(Fed. Cir. 1985).
43. See Powers & Carlson, supra note 36, at 81.
44. See 7 CHISUM, supra note 22, § 20.03[4][b][v], at 20-420 & n.313; Powers &
Carlson, supra note 36, at 81-82, 85-86.
45. See Powers & Carlson, supra note 36, at 85-86.
46. See id. at 86.
47. See, e.g., 7 CHISUM, supra note 22, § 20.03[4][b][v], at 20-419 to 20-420 & n.313;
Powers & Carlson, supra note 36, at 87.
48. See, e.g., Patent Holding Co. v. TG (USA) Corp., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1566,
1569 (E.D. Mich. 1998) ("When a defendant is relying on an advice of counsel defense, there is a split of authority as to whether the waiver of attorney-client privilege
extends to all work product relevant to advice of counsel on the issues of liability.").
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held that the "substantial need" exception 49 was satisfied after the defendant asserted an advice of counsel defense, thereby allowing broad

discovery of attorney work-product.5"

The effect of waiving the attorney-client privilege with respect to

communication concerning potential infringement and of allowing the
broad discovery of attorney work-product may be devastating to the
defendant, especially when the issues of infringement liability and

willfulness are tried before the same jury at the same time. 5' Discovery of such communication and work-product may prejudice the jury
to such a degree that the jury may find infringement even though the
evidence is irrelevant to infringement liability; 52 that is, to the objective determination of whether the patent has indeed been infringed by
the defendant.

On the other hand, the effect of not asserting an advice of counsel
defense, and thereby not waiving the attorney-client privilege, may be
more devastating to the defendant. Because the negative inference
rule allows the fact-finder to infer that willful infringement was committed in the absence of the advice of counsel, the twin threats of a
willfulness finding and an increased damages award to the plaintiff
become greater.53
Defendants are left with a dilemma: either sacrifice the advice of
counsel defense or sacrifice attorney-client privilege. 4 This dilemma
has been recognized by some district courts,55 as well as the Federal

Circuit, stating that the "[p]roper resolution of the dilemma of an accused infringer who must choose between the lawful assertion of the
49. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) (explaining the "substantial need" exception to
the work-product privilege).
50. See, e.g., Dunhall Pharm., Inc. v. Discus Dental, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1202,
1209-10 (C.D. Cal. 1998); see also Powers & Carlson, supra note 36, at 91 &
nn.279-84 (citing Mushroom Assocs. v. Monterey Mushrooms, Inc., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1767 (N.D. Cal. 1992); FMT Corp. v. Nissei ASB Co., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1073 (N.D. Ga. 1992); Handgards, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 413 F. Supp. 926 (N.D.
Cal. 1976), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 601 F.2d
986 (9th Cir. 1979)).
51. Several cases have refused to separate the issues of liability and willfulness.
See George M. Sirilla et al., Advice of Counsel-Defenseor Dilemma? Friendor Foe?,
81 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 376, 392 (1999) (citing Kimberly-Clark Corp. v.
James River Corp. of Va., 131 F.R.D. 607, 609 (N.D. Ga. 1989); Keyes Fibre Co. v.
Packaging Corp. of Am., 763 F. Supp. 374, 375 (N.D. Ill. 1991); THK Am., Inc. v.
NSK Co., 151 F.R.D. 625, 630-31 (N.D. Ill. 1993)).
52. See Powers & Carlson, supra note 36, at 94.
53. See id. at 81-82.
54. See, e.g., 7 CHISUM, supra note 22, § 20.03[4][b][v], at 20-419; Powers & Carlson, supra note 36, at 88 (quoting Mushroom Assocs., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1770).
55. E.g., Abbott Labs. v. Baxter Travenol Labs., Inc., 676 F. Supp. 831, 832-33
(N.D. Ill. 1987); see also Powers & Carlson, supra note 36, at 88 (citing Mushroom
Assocs., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1770; Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Cellpro, 160 F.R.D. 30,
33-35 (D. Del. 1995)).
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attorney-client privilege and avoidance of a willfulness finding if infringement is found, is of great importance. "56

Responding to this erosion of the attorney-client privilege and attorney work-product immunity, several acceptable solutions have
been suggested, including bifurcating trial into an infringement liability phase and a willful infringement liability phase;57 establishing privilege waiver guidelines;5 8 and abandoning the affirmative duty and
negative inference rules.5 9
Other solutions have been presented that call for the trial judge to

determine willfulness, entirely precluding the jury from the issue.6"
This scheme is advantageous, because there would be no waiver of the

attorney-client privilege before the jury makes an infringement liability finding; evidence of willfulness would become relevant only after a

jury finding of infringement.61 While discussing this solution, some

commentators have expressly rejected the right to a jury trial on willfulness.6 2 Therefore, a determination of whether there is a right to a

jury trial on willfulness is important because the existence of the right
directly affects how courts can deal with the conflict between current
rules on willful patent infringement and their effects on the attorneyclient privilege and attorney work-product immunity.

Furthermore, if the constitutional right to a jury trial6 3 exists with
regard to a particular issue in a civil action, then a jury finding on that
issue must be granted upon a timely request for a jury trial, and the

jury's finding is binding on the court.6 4 Therefore, if the right to a jury
56. Quantum Corp. v. Tandon Corp., 940 F.2d 642, 643 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
57. See, e.g., 7 CHISUM, supra note 22, § 20.03[4][b][v], at 20-436 & n.333; Donald
R. Dunner & Richard L. Rainey, Opinions of Counsel, Privilege in Patent Litigation
and Prejudicefrom ClaimingPrivilege, 376 PLI/PAT. 285, 299 (1993); John B. Pegram,
Increasing Recovery in Patent Cases, 350 PLI/PAT. 343, 358 (1992); Sirilla et al., supra
note 51, at 394-95. See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b) (providing courts the ability to
order separate trials).
58. See, e.g., Powers & Carlson, supra note 36, at 108-09.
59. See id. at 108; see also Dunner & Rainey, supra note 57, at 300 (discussing
negative inference).
60. See Littman, supra note 14, at 253 ("There appears to be no reason why the
issue of willful infringement should be submitted to the jury."); Pegram, supra note
57, at 359 ("[A]n accused infringer . . . need not voluntarily accept trial of willfulness
by the jury .... The rules concerning separate trials and avoidance of prejudice permit, and may even require, a court to keep the willfulness issue from the jury.") (citations omitted); Powers & Carlson, supra note 36, at 109-12 ("There are sound reasons
for reserving matters of willfulness to the court [as opposed to the jury].").
61. See Powers & Carlson, supra note 36, at 111-12.
62. See, e.g., Pegram, supra note 57, at 359 ("There is no right to jury trial of
willfulness, although dicta may have suggested the contrary.").
63. U.S. CONST. amend. VII ("In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved ....
").
64. See, e.g., Lincoln v. Bd. of Regents, 697 F.2d 928, 934 (11th Cir. 1983) ("When
a party has the right to a jury trial on an issue involved in a legal claim, the judge is of
course bound by the jury's determination of that issue ....'); Mayhue v. St. Francis
Hosp. of Wichita, Inc., No. 82-1854, 1988 WL 142410, at *3 (D. Kan. Dec. 30, 1988)
("The record establishes that plaintiff has not waived his Seventh Amendment right
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trial on willfulness exists, then the jury determines willfulness, and its
finding is binding on the trial judge. Although the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit had the opportunity to answer this constitutional question in 1995, it declined.6 5
Nevertheless, as long as a willfulness finding is required before an
increased damage award can be made, the constitutional right to a
jury trial on willfulness in patent infringement suits should exist because: (1) the "historical test" preserves the Seventh Amendment
right; 66
and (2) the Federal Circuit has implicitly recognized the
67
right.
IV.

THE "HISTORICAL TEST" PRESERVES THE SEVENTH
AMENDMENT RIGHT

The right to a jury trial on willfulness exists because the "historical
test" proves that the Seventh Amendment preserves the right. The
Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that
"[i]n Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall ex68
ceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.
However, before inquiring into the applicability of the Seventh
Amendment, the specific statute must be examined to determine
whether, through statutory construction, the statute itself addresses
the issue, avoiding the constitutional question completely.6 9 The applicable statute, 35 U.S.C. § 284, does not address the basis for the
court's "discretion" in awarding increased damages, much less address
the issue of willfulness. 7° Therefore, a Seventh Amendment analysis
is required to determine whether there is a right to a jury trial on
willfulness.

to a jury trial on common factual issues. Consequently,... the common factual issues
must first be decided by the jury .... The jury's findings on common issues will then
be binding ....
).
65. See Transmatic, Inc. v. Gulton Indus., Inc., 53 F.3d 1270, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(stating that the district court "held ... [the plaintiff] had no right under the Seventh
Amendment to a jury trial on any of the issues remaining in the case ... [including]
willfulness .... In view of the court's correct conclusion that [the plaintiff] waived its
right to a jury trial, we need not reach the court's alternative holding") (citations
omitted).
66. See infra Part IV.
67. See infra Part V.
68. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
69. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417 n.3 (1987) (citing Curtis v. Loether, 415
U.S. 189, 192 n.6 (1974); Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 365 (1974)).
70. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000).
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Seventh Amendment Analysis Under the Historical Test Used
in Markman

To determine whether there is a Seventh Amendment right to a jury
trial for a particular issue in a civil suit, the "historical test" is used.7 1
In Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,72 the United States Su-

preme Court stated that the historical test consisted of determining:
(1) whether the current cause of action either was a common law action in 1791 England, or is analogous to a cause of action that was

available in 1791, 73 and (2) whether the issue in question "must fall to
the jury in order to preserve the substance of the common-law right as
it existed in 1791." 74 If both of these determinations are answered

affirmatively, the Seventh Amendment guarantees the right to a jury

trial on the issue.75
In Markman, the historical test was applied to the issue of claim

construction in a patent infringement suit, with the Court holding that
claim construction, including terms of art within the claim, is a matter

of law to be decided by the judge.7 6 The formulation of the historical

test in Markman has been questioned because its effect is to narrow
the scope of the right to a jury trial, removing factual issues underlying

claim construction from the jury.7 7
Although the Court's application of the test has varied throughout

the years, 78 the Markman formulation of the historical test is used primarily in the present analysis for two reasons. First, Markman dealt
79

with claim construction, a sub-issue of a patent infringement

suit.

Likewise, willfulness is also a sub-issue of a patent infringement suit.8"
Second, Markman's effect of narrowing the scope of the right to a jury
71. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996) (citing
Charles W. Wolfram, The ConstitutionalHistory of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN.
L. REV. 639, 640-43 (1973)).
72. 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
73. See id. at 376 (citing Tull, 481 U.S. at 417).
74. Id.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 372.
77. See Margaret L. Moses, What the Jury Must Hear: The Supreme Court's Evolving Seventh Amendment Jurisprudence,68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 183, 224 (2000); The
Supreme Court, 1995 Term-Leading Cases, 110 HARV. L. REV. 266, 267 (1996).
78. See, e.g., Tull, 481 U.S. at 417 (stating that the test, in the context of statutory
actions, is composed of two steps: (1) a comparison with "18th-century actions
brought in the courts of England prior to the merger of the courts of law and equity";
and (2) an examination of both the "nature of the action and the remedy sought");
Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 & n.10 (1970) (stating that "[t]he Seventh
Amendment question depends on the nature of the issue to be tried rather than the
character of the overall action," and analyzing the nature of the issue by considering
the "premerger custom," the "remedy sought," and the "practical abilities and limitations of juries").
79. See Markman, 517 U.S. at 374 (citing SCHWARTZ, supra note 15, at 79-80 (2d
ed. 1996); 3 ERNEST BAINBRIDGE LIPSCOMB, III, LIPscoMB's WALKER ON PATENTS
§ 11:2, at 287-91 (3d ed. 1985)).
80. See Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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trial8 l makes its version of the historical test even more appropriate
when rigorously scrutinizing the existence of the right to a trial by jury
on an issue. If the Markman historical test shows that the right exists,
then it is highly probable that other versions of the test would also
show that there is a right to a jury trial. For these two reasons, the
following analysis parallels Markman's application of the historical
test.
B.
1.

Application of the Markman Historical Test to Willfulness
The Cause of Action-Patent Infringement-Existed in
1791 England

The first step in the Markman historical test is determining whether
the current cause of action either was a common law action in 1791
England or is analogous to a cause of action that was available in 1791
England.8 2 If the present cause of action is statutory, the action must
be compared to "'18th-century actions brought in the courts of England prior to the merger of the courts of law and equity."' 83 Because
a patent infringement suit is a statutory cause of action8 4 and patent
infringement suits were actions at law tried before a jury in 1791 England," a patent infringement suit must be tried to a jury upon request-affirmatively answering step one of the Markman historical
test.86
2.

A Jury Trial on Willfulness Is Necessary for the Preservation of
the Common-Law Right

Although the first step of the historical test is relatively straightforward, the second step is more complicated-determining whether a
jury determination on the issue of willfulness is "'necessary to preserve the "substance of the common-law right of trial by jury."' 8 7
81. See generallyMoses, supra note 77, at 183 (discussing how Markman narrowed
the scope of the right to a jury trial).

82.
83.
33, 42
84.

See id. at 224 (quoting Markman, 517 U.S. at 376).
Markman, 517 U.S. at 377 (quoting Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S.
(1989)).
See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000).

85. See Markman, 517 U.S. at 377; see also Turner v. Winter, 99 Eng. Rep. 1274,

1274-76 (K.B. 1787), microformed on The English Reports-Volumes 91 to 176 CDROM (Jutastat, Ltd.); Liardet v. Johnson, 62 Eng. Rep. 1000 (Ch. 1780), microformed
on The English Reports-Volumes 1 to 90 CD-ROM (Jutastat, Ltd.).

86. See Markman, 517 U.S. at 377 ("[Tlhere is no dispute that [patent] infringement cases today must be tried to a jury, as their predecessors were more than two
centuries ago."). Other non-Markman versions of the historical test require an additional inquiry into remedies. See, e.g., Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417-18

(examining both "the nature of the action and of the remedy sought" to determine
whether "a statutory action is more similar to cases that were tried in courts of law
than to suits tried in courts of equity or admiralty").
87. See Markman, 517 U.S. at 377 (quoting Tull, 481 U.S. at 426 (quoting Colgrove
v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 156 (1973))).
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Preservation of this "substance" has been cast in varying terms, such
as referring only to issues that are ""'regarded as fundamental, as inherent in and of the essence of the system of trial by
jury,"' .88 or
89
issues that involve the "most fundamental elements.
Different methods have been asserted to discern "fundamental" issues that are the "substance of the common-law right" to a jury trial. 90
Two such methods are distinguishing between issues of law and fact,
and comparing the issues in question to analogous common law issues
in 1791 England-a historical test of the issue within the overall historical test of both the action and the issue. 91
In regard to the law or fact distinction method, the jury determines
issues of fact, while the court determines issues of law. 92 A jury determination on an issue of fact is a "limitation imposed by the [Seventh]
[A]mendment." 93 A defendant's willfulness in a patent infringement
suit is an issue of fact.94 Therefore, according to this method, a jury
determination on willfulness is "'necessary to95preserve the "substance
of the common-law right of trial by jury."' 9.
However, the Court in Markman de-emphasized this somewhat
simple method of distinguishing between law and fact in order to preserve the right to a jury trial.96 Instead, the Court recommended using
an alternative historical test, with the historical inquiry being limited
to the specific issue in question rather than the overall suit or action of
which the issue is a part. 97 This historical-test-within-historical-test
approach also requires a two-step analysis: 98 (1) One must determine
if there was an exact antecedent in 1791 English common law to the
issue in question; 99 and (2) If no direct antecedent was available, one
must determine if there was an appropriately analogous practice existing at common law where the role of the jury was clearly defined. 1°°
If either of these determinations is answered affirmatively, then the
issue is regarded as "fundamental," and therefore "'necessary to pre88. See Tull, 481 U.S. at 426 (quoting Colgrove, 413 U.S. at 156 n.11 (quoting Austin Wakeman Scott, Trial by Jury and the Reform of Civil Procedure, 31 HARV. L.
REV.

669, 671 (1918))).

89. See Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 392 (1943).
90. See Markman, 517 U.S. at 377-78.
91. See id.
92. Bait. & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935); see also Ex
parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 310 (1920).
93. Peterson, 253 U.S. at 310.
94. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Gypsum Co., 195 F.3d 1322, 1334 (Fed.
Cir. 1999); SRI Int'l, Inc. v. Advanced Tech. Labs., Inc., 127 F.3d 1462, 1465 (Fed. Cir.
1997).
95. See Markman, 517 U.S. at 377 (quoting Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 426
(1987) (quoting Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 156 (1973))).
96. See id. at 378.
97. See id.
98. See id. (citing Tull, 481 U.S. at 420-21).
99. See id.

100. See id.
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serve the "substance of the common-law right of trial by jury,'"... 10 1
satisfying step two of the Markman historical test.
a.

The Absence of an Exact Antecedent to Willful Patent

Infringement and Increased Damages in 1791 England
The issue of willfulness or willful patent infringement was not addressed in patent infringement cases recorded in the English Reports
between 1740 and 1800.102 Indeed, the absence of a willfulness finding
in these cases later became an expressed rule of English courts in the
nineteenth century, with one court stating that the intent of the infringer was of no consequence in a patent infringement suit. 10 3 The
practice of awarding increased damages in patent infringement suits in
the United States is of statutory origin, 104 and the primary basis of the
10 5
award-willful infringement-is of American common-law origin.
Therefore, remedying willful patent infringement has no direct antecedent at common law in 1791 England.
b.

Punitive Damage Awards Are Analogous to Increased Damages
Because there is no exact antecedent to willfulness, the second step
of the historical analysis is required; that is, the determination of
whether an appropriately analogous cause of action existed at common law where the role of the jury was clearly defined.10 6 If there is
an appropriately analogous practice, the historical test is satisfied, and
101. See id. at 377-78 (quoting Tull, 481 U.S. at 426 (quoting Colgrove v. Battin,
413 U.S. 149, 156 (1973))).
102. Cases reviewed are Cartwright v. Amatt, 126 Eng. Rep. 1145 (C.P. 1799),
microformed on The English Reports-Volumes 91 to 176 CD-ROM (Jutastat, Ltd.);
Hornblower v. Boulton, 101 Eng. Rep. 1285 (K.B. 1799), microformed on The English
Reports-Volumes 91 to 176 CD-ROM (Jutastat, Ltd.); Boulton v. Bull, 126 Eng.
Rep. 651 (C.P. 1795), microformed on The English Reports-Volumes 91 to 176 CDROM (Jutastat, Ltd.); Turner v. Winter, 99 Eng. Rep. 1274 (K.B. 1787), microformed
on The English Reports-Volumes 91 to 176 CD-ROM (Jutastat, Ltd.); Liardet v.
Johnson, 62 Eng. Rep. 1000 (Ch. 1780), microformed on The English ReportsVolumes 1 to 90 CD-ROM (Jutastat, Ltd.); and Newsham v. Gray, 26 Eng. Rep. 575
(Ch. 1741), microformed on The English Reports-Volumes 1 to 90 CD-ROM (Jutastat, Ltd.).
103. See Stead v. Anderson, 136 Eng. Rep. 724, 724 (C.P. 1847), microformed on
The English Reports-Volumes 91 to 176 CD-ROM (Jutastat, Ltd.) ("[T]he issue...
must be determined by the acts done by the defendant, without reference to the existence or the non-existence of a fraudulent intention . . . ."); see also id. at 736 ("It
appears to us, that the intention was immaterial .... [W]e think it clear that the action
is maintainable in respect of what the defendant does, not of what he intends.").
104. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000); see also Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 5, 1 Stat. 318,
322, repealed by Act of Apr. 17, 1800, ch. 25, §§ 3, 4, 2 Stat. 37, 38, repealed by Act of
July 4, 1836, ch. 357, §§ 14, 21, 5 Stat. 117, 123, 125, repealed by Act of July 8, 1870, ch.
230, §§ 59, 111, 16 Stat. 198, 207, 216, repealed by Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, § 284, 66
Stat. 792, 813 (statutory forerunners to 35 U.S.C. § 284). See generally Powers & Carlson, supra note 36, at 66-67 (discussing the history of the Patent Act).
105. See infra Part IV.B.2.b.
106. See Markman, 517 U.S. at 378 ("Where there is no exact antecedent, the best
hope lies in comparing the modern practice to earlier ones whose allocation to court
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the issue must be tried to a jury to "'preserve the "substance of the
common-law right of trial by jury.' .1o7
"Punitive damages are sums awarded in addition to any compensatory or nominal damages, usually as punishment or deterrent levied
against a defendant found guilty of particularly aggravated misconduct, coupled with a malicious, reckless or otherwise wrongful state of
mind." ' Increased damages under § 2841°9 are analogous to punitive
damage awards for four reasons: (1) Increased damages are awards in
excess of compensatory damages; (2) An award of increased damages
is based on the defendant's conduct; that is, willful conduct or conduct
in bad faith; (3) The purpose of increased damages is to punish and
deter willful patent infringers; and (4) The Federal Circuit has expressly stated that increased damages are to be considered punitive
awards.
Punitive damage awards are money damages awarded in excess of
actual or compensatory damages. 110 Similarly, the amount of an increased damage award in a patent infringement suit is determined by
increasing, by an appropriate amount, the "damages ...found or as'
sessed."111
The "damages ...found or assessed" must be "adequate
to compensate for the infringement. 11 2 Courts have consistently interpreted that the compensatory damages awarded to the patentee for
financial losses suffered due to the infringement are the starting point
from which an increased award is determined. 13 Any amount above
these "damages" is in excess of compensation and should be regarded
as punitive damages. 4 Therefore, this is the first reason an award of
increased damages under 35 U.S.C. § 284 is analogous to a punitive
damages award.
In the great majority of jurisdictions, the applicability of punitive
damages and the amount to be awarded are dependent upon the defendant's state of mind and conduct." 5 Conduct supporting a punitive
damages award generally involves "some form of malice, willful and
or jury we do know, seeking the best analogy we can draw between an old and the
new.") (citations omitted).
107. See id. at 377 (quoting Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 426 (1987) (quoting
Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 156 (1973))).
108. 1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.11(1), at 455 (2d ed. 1993) (footnotes
omitted).
109. 35 U.S.C. § 284.
110. See 1 DOBBS, supra note 108, § 3.11(1), at 455.
111. See 35 U.S.C. § 284.
112. Id.
113. See, e.g., SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Labs. Corp., 926 F.2d 1161,
1164 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Stickle v. Heublein, Inc., 716 F.2d 1550, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
114. See Beatrice Foods v. New Eng. Printing & Lithographing Co., 923 F.2d 1576,
1580 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Paper Converting Mach. Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp., 745
F.2d 11, 23 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
115. See, e.g., 1 DOBBS, supra note 108, § 3.11(2), at 468; see also, e.g., W.R. Grace
& Co. v. Waters, 638 So. 2d 502, 503 (Fla. 1994) (discussing punitive damages in
Florida).
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wanton misconduct, or a reckless disregard for the rights and safety of
the plaintiff."1'16 Similarly, the Federal Circuit has stated that willfulness should be the primary basis for an award of increased damages in
a patent infringement suit,1 17 stating "enhanced damages may be
awarded only as a penalty for an infringer's increased culpability,
namely willful infringement or bad faith.""' 8 Thus, the basis for punitive damage awards and § 284 increased damage awards are the
same-the culpability of the defendant's conduct. This is the second
reason an award of increased damages is analogous to a punitive damage award.
In most jurisdictions, the purposes of punitive damage awards are to
punish the defendant and to deter both the defendant and others from
committing similar acts in the future." 9 In City of Newport v. Fact
Concert, Inc.,120 the United States Supreme Court held that punitive
damages are intended to "punish the tortfeasor whose wrongful action
was intentional or malicious, and to deter him and others."1112 Similarly, the Federal Circuit has held that increased damages are primarily intended to punish and deter willful patent infringers. 12 2 The
equivalent purposes of punitive damages and increased damages indicate that awarding increased damages is therefore a punitive award.
Finally, increased damages are analogous to punitive awards because the Federal Circuit has expressly stated that increased damages
are to be considered punitive awards. 12 3 Awarding increased damages
116. 1 LINDA L. SCHLUETER & KENNETH R. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES
§ 4.3(C)(1), at 165 (4th ed. 2000).
117. Sensonics, Inc. v. Aerosonic Corp., 81 F.3d 1566, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1996); DeltaX Corp. v. Baker Hughes Prod. Tools, Inc., 984 F.2d 410, 413 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Beatrice
Foods, 923 F.2d at 1578; State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 948 F.2d 1573, 1576
(Fed. Cir. 1991).
118. Beatrice Foods, 923 F.2d at 1579 (emphasis added). See also 7 CHISUM, supra
note 22, § 20.03[4][b][iii], at 20-338 n.112, for additional cases "reversing increased
awards for insufficient evidence of willfulness."
119. See 1 DOBBS, supra note 108, § 3.11(1), at 455, 457; 1 SCHLUETER & REDDEN,
supra note 116, § 2.2(A)(1), at 25-26.
120. 453 U.S. 247 (1981).
121. Id. at 266-67 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908, at 464 (1979);
WILLIAM L. PROSSER & W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 2, at 9 (5th ed. 1984)).

122. See Beatrice Foods, 923 F.2d at 1579; Mathis v. Spears, 857 F.2d 749, 754 (Fed.
Cir. 1988); Paper Converting Mach., Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp., 745 F.2d 11, 23
(Fed. Cir. 1984); see also 7 CHnsUM, supra note 22, § 20.03[4][b][iii], at 20-338 & n.112
("[T]he clear majority rule is that a court may not award increased damages solely for
compensation and without a finding of infringer culpability.") (emphasis added). But
see 7 CHISUM, supra note 22, § 20.03[4][b][iii], at 20-336 ("Whether the purpose of an
increased damage award should be exemplary.., or compensatory... is a longstanding controversy in the law. Perhaps the best view is that increased awards combine
both purposes.").
123. See Sensonics, Inc. v. Aerosonic Corp., 81 F.3d 1566, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1996);
Delta-X, 984 F.2d at 413; Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1221
(Fed. Cir. 1995); see also Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1996);
Brooktree v. Advanced Micro Devices, 977 F.2d 1555, 1581-82 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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involves the same major characteristics as awarding punitive damages.
Therefore, the determination of whether to award increased damages
in a patent infringement case is equivalent to a determination of
whether to award punitive damages in other causes of action.
c.

The Jury Determined Whether to Award Punitive Damages at
Common Law in 1791 England
Because a finding of willfulness for increased damages is equivalent
to finding that a defendant must pay punitive damages, the next step is
to determine whether the practice of awarding punitive damages existed at English common law in 1791.124 If awarding punitive damages
did exist, then an analogous practice to awarding increased damages
has appropriately been identified.1 2
Punitive damages did exist at English common law in 1791. The
practice of awarding punitive damages was first recognized at common law in 1763,26 with juries expressly awarding punitive damages
in the related cases Huckle v. Money1 7 and Wilkes v. Wood."2 8 In
Huckle, the Crown arrested the plaintiff and illegally searched the
plaintiff's home. 129 The government officer held the plaintiff in custody for approximately six hours. 3 ° The plaintiff, a printer, brought
31
actions for trespass, assault, and imprisonment against the Crown.1
The plaintiff's actual damages equaled only £20.132 However, the jury
awarded the plaintiff £300 in damages. 3 3 Strongly criticizing the defendant's conduct and concluding that the conduct was "worse than
the Spanish Inquisition," the court denied a request for new trial and
upheld the award of punitive damages, stating, "I think [the jurors]
have done right in giving exemplary damages.' 34 The court recognized that it was for the jury to decide if the defendant's conduct war135
ranted a punitive damage award to the plaintiff.
Similarly, in Wilkes v. Wood, 1 3 6 government officers entered
Wilkes's house, broke his locks, and seized his writings. 37 Wilkes
124. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 378 (1996).
125. See id.

126. See 1 SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 116, § 1.3(A), at 4-5 (citing Wilkes v.

Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.P. 1793), microformed on The English Reports-Volumes
91 to 176 CD-ROM (Jutastat, Ltd.)).
127. See 95 Eng. Rep. 768, 769 (C.P. 1763), microformed on The English ReportsVolumes 91 to 176 CD-ROM (Jutastat, Ltd.).
128. See 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 498-99 (C.P. 1763).
129. See Huckle, 95 Eng. Rep. at 768.
130. Id.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. Id.
134. See id. at 769.
135. See id.
136. 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.P. 1763), microformed on The English Reports-Volumes
91 to 176 CD-ROM (Jutastat, Ltd.).
137. See id. at 490.
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brought an action for trespass against the Crown and sought punitive
damages, calling on the jury to express its resentment by an award of
"large and exemplary damages.' 3 8 The amount of actual damages
was small because Wilkes was unable to account for the seized papers. 139 The court stated that "a jury have it in their power to give
damages for more than the injury received."' 40 In addition to being
compensatory, "[diamages are designed . . .as a punishment to the
guilty, to deter from any such proceeding for the future, and as a proof
of the detestation of the jury to the action itself."' 4 1 The jury found
for Wilkes and awarded £1,000 damages."' 2 In addition to recognizing
that a jury determines if punitive damages are necessary by focusing
on the defendant's conduct, the court expressed the twin goals of the
majority of American jurismodern punitive damages doctrine in1 the
3
dictions: punishment and deterrence. 1
Interestingly, both Huckle and Wilkes received punitive damages in
actions for trespass. 144 An action for trespass required, among other
elements, that the defendant actually or constructively possessed the
property of the plaintiff. 145 Similarly, patent infringement suits were
brought at law in 1791 England using a related action: trespass on the
case or action on the case.1 46 Trespass on the case was a broad remedy for any type of injury done to the person or property.14 7 Although these actions were distinct at common law, both involved
injury to another's property. Because a patent is considered property,"4 8 the practice of awarding increased damages for willful interference with that -property makes the analogy to the common law
practice of awarding punitive damages even stronger.
The practice of awarding punitive damages based on a defendant's
misconduct in a tort case involving injury to property did exist at com138. See id. at 489-90.
139. See id. at 499.
140. Id. at 498.
141. Id. at 498-99.
142. Id. at 499.
143. See id. at 498-99.
144. See Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768, 768 (C.P. 1763), microformed on The
English Reports-Volumes 91 to 176 CD-ROM (Jutastat, Ltd.) (bringing also actions
of assault and false imprisonment); Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. at 498-99.
145. See HENRY WINTHROP BALLANTINE & BENJAMIN J. SHIPMAN, HANDBOOK OF
COMMON-LAw PLEADING § 35, at 66 (3d ed. 1923).
146. See Turner v. Winter, 99 Eng. Rep. 1274, 1274 (K.B. 1787), microformed on
The English Reports-Volumes 91 to 176 CD-ROM (Jutastat, Ltd.); see also Boulton
v. Bull, 126 Eng. Rep. 651, 651 (C.P. 1795), microformed on The English ReportsVolumes 91 to 176 CD-ROM (Jutastat, Ltd.); Markman v. Westview Instruments,
Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 1013-14 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Newman, J., dissenting), affd, 517 U.S.
370 (1996). "Trespass on the case" and "action on the case" refer to the same cause of
action. See 75 AM. JUR. 2D Trespass § 7, at 14 (1991); BALLANTINE & SHIPMAN, supra
note 145, § 39, at 85 & n.4.
147. See BALLANTINE & SHIPMAN, supra note 145, § 39, at 85.
148. See Patlex v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 599 (Fed. Cir.), modified in part, rev'd
in part, affd in part, 771 F.2d 480 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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mon law in 1.791 England. 149 This is appropriately analogous to the
practice of awarding increased damages in a patent infringement suit
based on a defendant's willful or bad-faith infringement. Accordingly,
the role of the jury was clearly defined at common law. As shown in
Huckle and Wilkes, the jury determined, among other things, whether
the defendant's conduct merited a punitive damage award to the
plaintiff. 5 ' Therefore, today's analogous practice of awarding increased damages requires that a jury must determine whether to
award increased damages; that is, a jury must determine whether or
not the defendant's infringing conduct was willful. Thus, a jury finding on willfulness is "'necessary to preserve the "substance of the
common-law right of trial by jury.' "'I'
A jury finding on willfulness satisfies the historical test used in
Markman. The first prong of the analysis is satisfied-patent infringement suits were actions at law tried before a jury in 1791 England.' 52
The second prong of the test is also satisfied-a jury determination on
willfulness is "'necessary to preserve the "substance of the commonlaw right of trial by jury."' .153 Although there is no direct antecedent
to the practice of finding willful patent infringement, a jury determination is necessary because the finding of willfulness is analogous to a
jury determining whether to award punitive damages in actions tried
at law in 1791. Therefore, the historical test proves that the Seventh
Amendment right extends to a jury determination on willfulness in
patent infringement suits.
V.

COURTS IMPLICITLY RECOGNIZE THE RIGHT

The right to a jury trial on willfulness also exists because the Federal
Circuit has implicitly recognized this right. The court has done so by:
154
(1) recognizing that jury findings on willfulness are non-advisory;
155
(2) recognizing the jury's role as the finder of willfulness;
and (3)
149. See supra notes 124-46 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 126-43 and accompanying text. The jury function also included determining the amount of punitive damages. See supra notes 134, 140 and
accompanying text. In willful patent infringement suits, 35 U.S.C. § 284 specifies that
the trial judge makes this determination. See infra Part VI.
151. See Markman, 517 U.S. at 377 (quoting Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 426
(1987) (quoting Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 156 (1973))).
152. See id. at 376-77.
153. See id. at 377 (quoting Tull, 481 U.S. at 426 (quoting Colgrove, 413 U.S. at
156)).
154. See Polymer Indus. Prods. Co. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 10 Fed. Appx.
812, 818, Nos. 00-1271, 00-1299, 2001 WL 253259, at *4 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 13, 2001), cert.
denied, 534 U.S. 949 (2001); Va. Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 866
(Fed. Cir. 1997); Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Shiley, Inc.
v. Bentley Labs., Inc., 794 F.2d 1561, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1986). But see 7 CHISUM, supra
note 22, § 20.03[4][b][vii], at 20-452 ("[Tjhe jury's ... determination of willfulness is
only advisory to the trial judge.").
155. See, e.g., Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc., 156 F.3d 1154 passim (Fed. Cir. 1998); Braun
v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 975 F.2d 815 passim (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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expressly stating that there is a "right to a jury determination" on
willfulness.15 6
A.

Recognition that Jury Findings on Willfulness Are Non-Advisory

First, the Federal Circuit has implicitly recognized the right to a jury
trial on willfulness, consistently recognizing that jury findings on willfulness are non-advisory. If a jury finding on an issue is deemed to be
non-advisory, and therefore would be binding on the trial judge, then
the constitutional right to a jury trial attaches to that issue. 1 57 Federal
Circuit opinions supporting the position that willfulness findings are
non-advisory include Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd.,
Virginia Panel Corp. v.
MAC Panel Co.,159 Shiley, Inc. v. Bentley Laboratories, Inc.,160
and
61
Polymer Industrial Products Co. v. Bridgestone/Firestone,Inc.1
The Federal Circuit implicitly recognized the right to a jury trial on
willfulness by acknowledging a jury finding on willfulness is non-advisory in Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd.'6 2 In Jurgens, George and Margaret
Jurgens brought an infringement suit against CBK for alleged infringement of a patent directed to windsock duck decoys. 1 63 After a
partial summary judgment eliminated the issue of the patent's validity,
the issues remaining, actual damages and willfulness, were tried to a
jury.

1 64

In addition to awarding compensatory damages, the jury found that
CBK's conduct was willful. 165 However, the district court refused to
award increased damages because: (1) CBK had relied upon the opinion of counsel; and (2) The Jurgenses had failed to mark the decoys to
provide notice of their patent. 16 6 The Federal Circuit held that these
reasons were contrary to the willfulness finding of the jury, stating
that "[w]hen the jury reached its verdict that CBK acted willfully and
in bad faith in infringing the patent, it necessarily determined both
that CBK had notice of the Jurgenses' patent rights and that it acted in
disregard of those rights.' 1 67 The court remanded the case, giving the
district court an opportunity to provide alternative reasons why increased damages were not appropriate-reasons that did not contradict the jury's factual finding of willfulness. 168 This remand by the
156. See Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
157. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
158. See 80 F.3d 1566, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
159. See 133 F.3d 860, 866 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
160. See 794 F.2d 1561, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
161. See 10 Fed. Appx. 812, 818, Nos. 00-1271, 00-1299, 2001 WL 253259, at *4
(Fed. Cir. Mar. 13, 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 949 (2001).
162. See 80 F.3d 1566, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
163. Id. at 1568.
164. Id. at 1569.
165. See id.
166. Id.
167. See id. at 1573.
168. See id. at 1572-73.
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court shows that a jury's finding on willfulness should be upheld and is
non-advisory-implicitly recognizing the right to a jury trial on
willfulness.
Likewise, Virginia Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co.'6 9 followed the
principles in Jurgens.'7 ° In Virginia Panel, Virginia Panel sued MAC
Panel for willfully infringing its patent directed to engaging components used for testing systems consisting of "thousands of electronic
'
connections, such as airplane black boxes." 171
Although the jury
found willfulness, the district court increased damages under § 284 by
ten percent. 172 After MAC Panel appealed the judgment, Virginia
Panel cross-appealed relying on Jurgens, arguing that the district court
"abused its discretion by disregarding the jury's finding of willfulness."'

73

The court affirmed the ten percent increase by distinguishing

Jurgens stating, "Unlike in Jurgens, the district court's factual findings
are not inconsistent with the jury's finding of willfulness. The district
court explicitly accepted the jury's finding of willfulness and carefully
considered other 'factors that are mitigating or ameliorating.'"17 4 Because the district court did not ignore the jury's finding of willfulness
or consider the finding only advisory, the increased amount was affirmed. 175 Therefore, consistent with Jurgens, the Federal Circuit: (1)
recognized a jury's role in determining willfulness; and (2) implicitly
held that a jury's finding on willfulness is non-advisory; 176 that is, a
judge cannot ignore the finding but must provide alternative reasons
for small increased damage awards.
In Shiley, Inc. v. Bentley Laboratories, Inc.,17 7 the court expressly
rejected the trial court's label of the jury's findings on willfulness as
"advisory," in order for the trial court to make its own findings of
fact. 178 According to the court, treating the finding as "advisory" was
"neither appropriate nor necessary.' 1 79 The court continued, "[aill
fact findings of a jury are non-advisory, unless made in an area expressly removed from jury verdict."' 8 °
Another expressed rejection of the proposition that a jury's finding
of willfulness is only advisory is found in Polymer Industrial Products
169. 133 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
170. See id. at 866-67.
171. See id. at 862-63.
172. Id. at 863-64.
173. See id. at 864, 866.
174. See id. at 867 (quoting Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826 (Fed. Cir.
1992), abrogatedin part on other grounds by Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995), affd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996)).
175. See id.
176. See id.
177. 794 F.2d 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
178. Id. at 1568.
179. Id.
180. Id.
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Co. v. Bridgestone/Firestone,Inc.'81 In Polymer, the court stated that
"the district court initially mistook the jury's verdict of willfulness as
merely advisory, it later corrected itself, vacated its contrary finding of
nonwillfulness, and properly reinstated the jury verdict of willfulness
as 'supportable on the evidence.'"182
Other cases suggest, either explicitly or implicitly, that a jury finding
on willfulness is binding on the trial judge, and therefore is not advisory. 8 3 Although these cases are district court and pre-Federal Circuit (pre-1982) court opinions, they are nevertheless instructive as to
confirming the Federal Circuit's reasoning in Jurgens, Virginia Panel,
Shiley, and Polymer.
In contrast, one of the most common reasons used to deny the right
to a jury trial on willfulness is that the jury's finding is only advisory to
the trial judge. 184 Cases commonly cited to support this position are
White v. Mar-Bel, Inc.,185 Swofford v. B & W, Inc.,186 Modine Manu-

facturing Co. v. Allen Group,
Inc., 87 and Brooktree Corp. v. Ad1 88
vanced Micro Devices, Inc.
In White v. Mar-Bel, Inc.,' 89 White brought an action against MarBel for infringing his patent directed to a plastic cutting device. 9 ° Although the jury found the patent had been willfully infringed, the district court entered a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, holding
that the patent was invalid due to obviousness. 191 On appeal, the Fifth
Circuit reversed in part, holding that the patent was valid and in181. See 10 Fed. Appx. 812, 818, Nos. 00-1271, 00-1299, 2001 WL 253259, at *4
(Fed. Cir. Mar. 13, 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 949 (2001).
182. Id. at 818, 2001 WL 253259, at *4 (emphasis added).
183. See, e.g., 7 CHISUM, supra note 22, § 20.03[4][b][vii], at 20-453 n.358. But cf.
Hammerquist v. Clarke's Sheet Metal, Inc., 658 F.2d 1319, 1325-26 (9th Cir. 1981)
(stating "because willful infringement involves a mental state peculiarly in the realm
of jury judgment ..."), modified sub nom. Sarkisian v. Winn-Proof Corp., 688 F.2d
647 (9th Cir. 1982); Creative Cookware, Inc. v. Northland Aluminum Prod., Inc., 678
F.2d 746, 749 (8th Cir. 1982) ("In the absence of a motion for directed verdict, and
finding no basis for plain error, we are thus bound by the jury's finding of infringement and willfulness."); Antonious v. Progroup, Inc., 216 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 706, 707
(E.D. Tenn. 1982) ("In view of the jury's finding of a willful infringement.., the jury's
award of compensatory damages was tripled by the Court."), affd on other grounds,
699 F.2d 337 (6th Cir. 1983); Norfin, Inc. v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 625 F.2d 357, 366
(10th Cir. 1980) ("[A] jury's finding of willful and deliberate infringement must stand,
unless determined to be clearly erroneous.").
184. See 7 CHIsUM, supra note 22, § 20.03[4][b][vii], at 20-452 ("[Tlhe jury's ...
determination of willfulness is only advisory to the trial judge."); Littman, supra note
14, at 250 ("If the trial is by jury, then the jury's function is to determine actual damages only, and the jury's determination of willfulness is only advisory to the trial
judge.").
185. See 509 F.2d 287, 292 (5th Cir. 1975).
186. See 336 F.2d 406, 413 (5th Cir. 1964).
187. See 917 F.2d 538, 543 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
188. See 977 F.2d 1555, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
189. See 509 F.2d 287 (5th Cir. 1975).
190. Id. at 288.
191. See id. at 289 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000)).
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fringed.1 92 However, the Fifth Circuit found that the district court did
not abuse its discretion when it declined to award treble damages
based on willful infringement.' 9 3 If the court had stopped at this
point, there would be no conflict with Jurgens or Virginia Panel because both cases state that a trial court's decision to decline an increased damage award is reviewed under an abuse of discretion
standard.194 However, the Fifth Circuit went further, holding and expressly asserting that a jury's finding on willfulness is advisory.1 95 The
court stated that "[w]ith regard to the conditional rulings of the district court as to treble damages ... the jury's finding that defendants
1 96
willfully infringed ... is advisory only."
Clearly, this is contrary to the principles asserted in the subsequent
cases of Virginia Panel and Jurgens. Harmonization is probably impossible because the language used in each opinion is diametrically
opposed to the other.' 97 Therefore, one must resort to technicalities
to erode White's precedential value and influence on today's law. The
technicalities, discussed below, are: (1) This is a Fifth Circuit decision,
not a Federal Circuit decision; and (2) This decision is several years
older than decisions affirming the jury's finding as non-advisory.
The first technicality eroding White's precedential value is dispositive because in 1982, the Federal Circuit was created to unify patent
law in the United States. 19 Prior to the Federal Circuit formation, it
was formidable to get a patent upheld in many federal circuit courts,
and a wide divergence existed among the circuits regarding patent law
and how patents should be viewed.' 99 Aside from the United States
Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit determines what the patent law is
because it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction in patent cases.2 °° In
fact, the Supreme Court has expressly referred to the Federal Circuit's
"special expertise" in patent law. 20 ' Therefore, when the Federal Circuit rules on a particular subject, such as willfulness, directly contradicting previous circuit court holdings on point, the controlling law is
192. Id. at 292-93.
193. Id. at 292.
194. See Va. Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 867 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(citing Nat'l Presto Indus., Inc. v. W. Bend Co., 76 F.3d 1185, 1193 (Fed. Cir. 1996));
Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
195. See White, 509 F.2d at 292.
196. Id. (citing 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000); 8 ANTHONY WILLIAM DELLER, DELLER'S
WALKER ON PATENTS § 757, at 624-25 (2d ed. 1973)).
197. Compare cases cited supra notes 185-88, with cases cited supra notes 158-61.
198. See ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT, at ix (5th ed.
Supp. 2002) (citing Chem. Eng'g Corp. v. Marlo, Inc., 754 F.2d 331 (Fed. Cir. 1984));
see also Chem. Eng'g, 754 F.2d at 333 ("This court is charged with the duty of increasing doctrinal stability in the field of patent law.").
199. See ROBERT PATRICK MERGES, PATENT LAW AND POLICY 12 (2d ed. 1997).
200. See Chem. Eng'g, 754 F.2d at 333 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1295(a), 1338(a) (2000)).
201. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40 (1997).
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the Federal Circuit's holding.2" 2 The Federal Circuit has exercised its
power to overrule pre-1982 circuit court patent cases on several
occasions.2 °3
The second technicality eroding White's precedential value is that
White was decided in 1975;204 seven years before the Federal Circuit
was formed, 20 5 and more than ten years before the Federal Circuit
began consistently recognizing that a jury's finding on willfulness is
not simply advisory but is binding on the trial judge.20 6
An additional Fifth Circuit opinion supporting the assertion that
willfulness findings are advisory is Swofford v. B & W, Inc. 2° 7 In
Swofford, the Fifth Circuit stated that "questions of willfulness, deliberateness, and increased damages should properly await final judgment. ' 208 For support, the court quoted another case that promoted
the practice of waiting until final judgment to make findings of willful
and deliberate infringement, "'since only then can the full nature and
deterextent of the infringement be disclosed and a fully enlightened
20 9
mination made as to whether a punitive award is justified."'
The court in Swofford also rejected the right to a jury trial as to
whether increased damages should be awarded, stating that it found
"no authority for the proposition that the parties enjoyed a constitutional right to jury trial on the award and amount of exemplary damages.1 210 Again, Swofford suggests a position that cannot be
harmonized with more recent Federal Circuit cases. The precedential
value of this Fifth Circuit case must also be diminished in the same
way as White's-by highlighting the weight of the Federal Circuit's
authority against regional circuit courts' authority regarding patent
law, and by emphasizing the age of the decision in light of the more
202. See S. Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370-71 & n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1982)
(designating holdings of the predecessor courts, the Court of Claims and the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals, as binding precedent, but expressly stating that the Federal Circuit can overrule earlier holdings and is not bound by any other body of law,
necessarily implying that the Federal Circuit is not bound by and may overrule other
circuit court decisions on patent law).
203. See, e.g., Pauline Newman, The Federal Circuit: Judicial Stability or Judicial
Activism?, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 683, 686-87 (1993); see also Superior Fireplace Co. v.
Majestic Prods. Co., 270 F.3d 1358, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (addressing whether Third
Circuit precedent is controlling, the court stated that "decisions of regional circuits on
issues within our exclusive jurisdiction are not binding on this court"); State Contracting & Eng'g Corp. v. Florida, 258 F.3d 1329, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("We have
established that in matters of our own jurisdiction, regional circuit law is not binding
....
), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1131 (2002).
204. White v. Mar-Bel, Inc., 509 F.2d 287, 287 (5th Cir. 1975).
205. See HARMON, supra note 198, at ix ("[T]he Federal Circuit was created October 1, 1982.").
206. See supra notes 158-61 for dates of some of these decisions.
207. See 336 F.2d 406, 413 (5th Cir. 1964).
208. Id.
209. See id. (quoting E-I-M Co. v. Phila. Gear Works, Inc., 223 F.2d 36, 42 (5th Cir.
1955)).
210. See id. at 412 (emphasis added).
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recent opinions affirming the binding effect of a jury's finding on
willfulness.2 1 a
Modine Manufacturing Co. v. Allen Group, Inc. 212 also arguably denies the right to a jury trial on willfulness, by implicitly holding that a
jury's finding on willfulness is only advisory.2 13 In fact, the dissent in
Jurgens stated that the majority's decision contradicted Modine Manufacturing.2 14 Unlike White and Swofford, because Modine Manufacturing is a Federal Circuit case decided in 1990, simplistic
technicalities such as circuit court opinions rather than Federal Circuit
opinions and dates that question precedential value do not apply.2 15
In Modine Manufacturing, the jury determined that the Allen
Group had willfully infringed Modine's patent directed to a heat exchanger.2 16 However, the district court denied Modine's motion for
increased damages.2 17 On appeal, Modine argued that the trial court
abused its discretion by refusing to award increased damages after the
jury found willfulness, contending that the trial court's statement that
willfulness "'was sufficiently close on the evidence"' contradicted the
jury's finding of willfulness. 21 8 In effect, Modine argued that the trial
court relegated the jury's finding from binding to advisory status.21 9
The Federal Circuit affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the
jury's finding of willfulness did not require an award of increased
2 20
damages.
Although the dissent in Jurgens suggests otherwise,22 1 Modine Manufacturing does not expressly contradict Jurgens and the two cases can
be readily harmonized. In Modine Manufacturing,the Federal Circuit
acknowledged that the trial judge may use his or her discretion when
determining the amount of increased damages, stating that "a finding
of willful infringement merely authorizes, but does not mandate, an
award of increased damages. . . . [T]he decision whether or not ' 222
to
award fees is still committed to the discretion of the trial judge.
Furthermore, the trial judge in Modine Manufacturing"carefully considered the finding of willful infringement" and stated that "willfulness was 'sufficiently close on the evidence.' ,223
211. Swofford was decided in 1964. Id. at 406.
212. 917 F.2d 538 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
213. See id. at 543.
214. Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1573-74 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Cowen, J.,
dissenting).
215. See supra notes 198-203 and accompanying text.
216. See Modine Mfg., 917 F.2d at 540.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 543.
219. See id.
220. Id.
221. See Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1573-74 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Cowen, J.,
dissenting).
222. Modine Mfg., 917 F.2d at 543 (citations omitted).
223. See id.
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However, unlike the trial judge in Modine Manufacturing, the trial
judge in Jurgens expressly contradicted the jury's finding. 2 4 In
Jurgens, the trial judge refused to increase damages for reasons that
directly contradicted the jury's finding of willful infringement-the
judge stated that CBK had no notice of the patent and acted on the
advice of counsel.2 2 5 In effect, the trial judge maintained that CBK
did not infringe willfully, directly denying the jury's finding of willfulness. 2 26 In contrast, the judge in Modine Manufacturing did not disregard the jury's finding of willfulness, instead he used it as a227factor in
considering the appropriate amount of increased damages.
Additionally, Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. 2 2 8 is
occasionally cited to establish that a jury's finding on willfulness is
23 0
Simionly advisory, 2 2 ' and was also cited by the dissent in Jurgens.
lar to Modine Manufacturing, the Federal Circuit in Brooktree affirmed the trial court's decision not to award increased damages based
on willfulness, in part, because the "question of willfulness was 'sufficiently close on the evidence."' 231 However, unlike Jurgens, the trial
judge did not disregard the jury's finding of willfulness, but observed
that there was "sufficient evidence of willfulness to sustain the jury
verdict. '23 2 Jurgens, Modine Manufacturing, and Brooktree are consistent in that the trial judge is free to consider the jury's finding of
willfulness when determining the amount of increased damages to
award, but the judge may not disregard the finding altogether.
Thus, with the exception of some pre-1982 circuit court cases, the
courts have consistently recognized that a jury's finding of willfulness
is not advisory but binding on the trial judge. The judge is not free to
completely disregard and contradict the finding, but is required to
consider the jury's finding in order to award increased damages. Furthermore, by considering a jury's finding on willfulness as non-advisory and binding, the Federal Circuit is implicitly recognizing the right
to a jury trial on willfulness.
B.

Recognition of the Jury's Role in Finding Willfulness

Second, the Federal Circuit has recognized the right to a jury trial
on willfulness by implicitly or explicitly acknowledging the role of the
jury in finding willfulness. Recognizing that an issue is proper for jury
determination, when a jury trial is requested, suggests that a right to a
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Compare id., with Jurgens, 80 F.3d at 1572.
See Jurgens, 80 F.3d at 1572.
See id. at 1573.
Modine Mfg., 917 F.2d at 543.
977 F.2d 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
See id. at 1581.
Jurgens, 80 F.3d at 1573-74 (Cowen, J., dissenting).
See Brooktree, 977 F.2d at 1581 (quoting Modine Mfg., 917 F.2d at 543).
See id. at 1582.
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jury trial exists for that particular issue.2 33 The cases cited in subpart
A of Part V above are examples of holdings affirming the jury's role in
determining willfulness.2 34 Additional opinions also acknowledge the
role of the jury in determining willfulness. 235 With the exception of
the Jurgens dissent, these opinions do not question the jury's role in
determining willfulness, which suggests that the courts recognize the
right to a jury determination on willfulness.
One additional opinion acknowledging the jury's role in determining willfulness is Braun, Inc. v. Dynamics Corp. of America.2 36 In
Braun, Braun brought a patent infringement action against the defendant for infringing Braun's design patent directed to an electric
blender.2 37 The jury found, inter alia, that Braun's patent had been
willfully infringed.2 38 The Federal Circuit reversed the jury's verdict
on willfulness due to insufficient evidence.2 3 9 Addressing the role of
the jury in willfulness determinations, the court stated that "[w]hether
infringement is willful is a question of fact, and the jury's determination as to willfulness is therefore reviewable under the substantial evidence standard. Willfulness is determined from the totality of the
circumstances, and must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. ' 24 ° Accordingly, the Braun court explicitly recognized the
jury's role in determining willfulness by emphasizing that a jury's determination of willfulness is reviewed like any other jury finding,
under the appropriate standard of review.2 4 1
Another recent case recognizing the role of the jury is Tronzo v.
Biomet, Inc. 242 In Tronzo, the jury found, among other things, that
Biomet had willfully infringed Tronzo's patent directed to a device for
hip implants.2 4 3 Similar to Braun, the Federal Circuit reversed the
finding but never questioned the jury's role in determining willfulness-implicitly recognizing the jury as the fact-finder of
willfulness.2 4 4
The jury's role in determining willfulness is expressly or implicitly
recognized as a matter of course in cases such as Braun and Tronzo.
233. See, e.g., Fischer Imaging Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 187 F.3d 1165, 1172-74 (10th
Cir. 1999) (holding that a right to a jury trial on reasonable price under a U.C.C.
provision exists because, inter alia, the determination of such a price is a proper task
for the jury).
234. See supra notes 158-82 and accompanying text.
235. See, e.g., Jurgens v. McKasy, 927 F.2d 1552, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
236. See 975 F.2d 815 passim (Fed. Cir. 1992).
237. Id. at 818.

238. Id.
239. Id. at 822-23.
240. See id. at 822 (citations omitted).
241. See id. at 822-23.
242. See 156 F.3d 1154 passim (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also Tronzo v. Biomet, 236 F.3d
1342, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1035 (2001).
243. See Tronzo, 156 F.3d at 1156-57.
244. See id. at 1162.
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This recognition of the jury's role in these cases indicates that the Federal Circuit has implicitly recognized that when a jury has been requested, there is the right to a jury determination on willfulness.
C. Acknowledgment of the "Right" to a Jury Finding on Willfulness
by the Federal Circuit
Third, the right to a jury trial on willfulness was implicitly recognized in Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., Ltd.,2 4 when the Federal
Circuit expressly acknowledged that some type of right exists that allows a willfulness determination by the jury.2 46
In Richardson, Richardson sued Suzuki for infringement of a patent
directed to a motorcycle rear-wheel suspension system. 247 The jury
found that the patent was valid and was infringed by Suzuki. 248 However, the district court refused to submit the issue of willfulness to the
jury because of insufficient evidence.2 49 On appeal, the Federal Circuit remanded because evidence existed that, when viewed in the light
most favorable to Richardson, showed there could be more than one
reasonable conclusion in regard to willfulness.2 5 ° Using language
strongly supportive of the right to a jury trial on willfulness, the court
stated:
Richardson has the right of jury determination of this factual question. Willfulness of behavior is a classical jury question of intent.
When trial is had to a jury, the issue should be decided by the jury.
*

.

.The jury's findings on the issue of willfulness will be pertinent

to the 2uestion of multiplication of damages under 35 U.S.C.
§ 284 ....
This "right of jury determination" strongly indicates that the court
means there is the constitutional right to a jury trial on willfulness.
The only reason to consider this recognition implicit25 2is the lack of the
word "constitutional" in front of the word "right.
245. 868 F.2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
246. See id. at 1250.
247. Id. at 1230, 1233.
248. Id. at 1233.
249. Id. at 1250.
250. See id.
251. See id. (citations omitted).
252. Richardson is an interesting case when compared to Transmatic,Inc. v. Gulton
Industries, Inc., 53 F.3d 1270 (Fed. Cir. 1995), where the Federal Circuit indicated that
it never had determined this issue, see id. at 1279. Transmatic was decided in 1995,
while Richardson was decided in 1989. See id. at 1270. A possible explanation for this
is that the Federal Circuit is sometimes viewed as panel-dependent; that is, the position of the Federal Circuit on a particular issue in a particular case is dependent upon
whether the case is a panel decision, and if so, which justices are on the panel. See,
e.g., John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, How Federal Circuit Judges Vote in Patent
Validity Cases, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 745, 745 (2000) ("Patent lawyers-at least those
who regularly practice before the Federal Circuit-are firmly convinced that the outcome of their case depends on the panel they draw."). However, the results of this
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Therefore, the right to a jury trial on willfulness has been implicitly
recognized by the Federal Circuit because: (1) Jury findings on willfulness are not advisory; (2) In a jury trial, determining willfulness has
been expressly and implicitly recognized as a role for the jury; and (3)
At least one opinion has recognized that there is a "right" to such a
jury determination.

VI.

THERE

Is No

RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL ON THE AMOUNT OF
INCREASED DAMAGES

Although there is the right to a jury trial on willfulness, there is no
right to a jury trial on the amount of increased damages. While it has
been suggested otherwise," 3 this right does not exist because the Seventh Amendment historical test is inapplicable, and therefore may not
be used to show Seventh Amendment preservation. This inapplicability of the right to a jury determination on the amount of increased
damages is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 284.254 Therefore, before discussing the effect of statutory jury preclusion on the Seventh Amendment
right to a jury trial, this jury preclusion must be verified by: (1) applying accepted statutory interpretation methods; and (2) reviewing Federal Circuit and United States Supreme Court opinions interpreting
§ 284 and related statutes.
A.

Statutory Interpretation

Once the Supreme Court's method of statutory interpretation has
been used to interpret 35 U.S.C. § 284, it is clear that the jury is not to
decide the amount of increased damages to be awarded. 5 When in25 6
terpreting a statute, "'[t]he starting point.., is the language itself.' ,
The statute states that "[w]hen the damages are not found by a jury,
the court shall assess them. In either event the court may increase the
damages up to three times the amount found or assessed. ' 25 7 In the
first sentence of this portion of the statute, the words "jury" and
"court" refer to different entities because the court functions in the
alternative of the jury function. The second sentence gives the
study did not show any trends among justices in regard to patent validity; willfulness
was not addressed in the study. See id. at 753-58. The panels were composed of
different justices in each case. The panel in Transmatic was composed of Archer,
Chief Judge; and Plager and Laurie, Circuit Judges. Transmatic,53 F.3d at 1272. The
panel in Richardson was composed of Smith, Circuit Judge; Skelton, Senior Circuit
Judge; and Newman, Circuit Judge. Richardson, 868 F.2d at 1229.
253. See Wu, supra note 24, at 452-53 (comparing copyright law, specifically statutory damages, and Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340 (1998), to
increased damages in patent law and concluding that the issue is proper for the jury).
254. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000).
255. See generally Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 265 (1981); 35 U.S.C. § 284.
256. Watt, 451 U.S. at 265 (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring)).
257. 35 U.S.C. § 284.
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"court" the task of increasing damages, not the "jury." If the jury
does not increase damages, then the "court" must refer to the trial

judge. Therefore, it is the function of the trial judge to increase
damages.
The legislative history and purpose also support this face-value interpretation of the statute. According to the Supreme Court, a further

step may be necessary in interpreting the statute because "ascertainment of the meaning apparent on the face of a single statute need not
end the inquiry .... The circumstances of the enactment of particular
legislation may persuade a court that Congress did not intend words
of common meaning to have their literal effect."2'58 The legislative
history of the Patent Act of 1952,259 currently 35 U.S.C. § 284, is
equivalent to the language of previous legislation, including the Patent
Act of 1836260 and the Patent Act of 1870,261 both of which provided

the court with the discretion to increase damages above the jury
verdict.2 62
Removing the determination of the amount of increased damages

completely from the jury has a long history, beginning in 1800 with
amendments to the Patent Act of 1793.263 The amendments of 1800
modified the damages provision of the Patent Act of 1793 to "a sum
equal to three times the actual damages. ' '2 64 Before the amendment,
trebling the amount of actual damages was the minimum amount of
damages that could be awarded, 26 5 necessarily implying that the jury
could award more if appropriate. After the amendment, the jury had
absolutely no discretion in the amount of increased damages awarded
258. Watt, 451 U.S. at 266 (citations omitted).
259. Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, § 284, 66 Stat. 792, 813 (current version at 35
U.S.C. § 284).
260. Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 14, 5 Stat. 117, 123, repealed by Act of July 8.
1870, ch. 230, §§ 59, 111, 16 Stat. 198, 207, 216.
261. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 59, 16 Stat. 198, 207, repealed by Patent Act of
1952, ch. 950 § 284, 66 Stat. at 815.
262. Compare Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, § 284, 66 Stat. at 813, with Act of July 4,
1836, ch. 357, § 14, 5 Stat. 117, 123:
[I]n any action for damages.., a verdict shall be rendered for the plaintiff in
such action, it shall be in the power of the court to render judgment for any
sum above the amount found by such verdict as the actual damages sustained by the plaintiff, not exceeding three times the amount thereof ....
and Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 59, 16 Stat. at 207 (giving courts discretion to "enter
judgment thereon for any sum above the amount found by the verdict as the actual
damages sustained," with the total damages "not exceeding three times the amount of
such verdict"). See also Powers & Carlson, supra note 36, at 66 (citing S. REP. No. 821979, at 29-30 (1952); H.R. REP. No. 82-1923, at 29-30 (1952)).
263. Act of Apr. 17, 1800, ch. 25, § 3, 2 Stat. 37, 38, repealed by Act of July 4, 1836,
ch. 357, § 21, 5 Stat. 117, 125.
264. Id. (emphasis added).
265. See Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 5, 1 Stat. 318, 322, repealed by Act of Apr.
17, 1800, ch. 25, § 4, 2 Stat. at 38.
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because the increased damage amount was automatically determined
by the mandatory trebling provision.2 6 6
The Patent Act of 1836 removed the mandatory provision, giving
the "court" the discretion to increase damages above the amount of

actual damages within the range from zero to three times the amount
of actual damages.

267

However, seemingly maintaining the spirit of

the 1800 amendments, this "discretion" was not returned to the

jury.2 6 8 As interpreted by the Supreme Court, the word "court" in the
1836 Act did not refer to the jury; the judge was given the discretion

to determine the amount of increased damages. 269 This configuration
was maintained in both the Patent Act of 1870270 and the Patent Act
of 1952,271 with the latter in force today as 35 U.S.C. § 284.272 When
Congress makes this type of incorporation, the Supreme Court has

stated that it presumes Congress was aware of the interpretation of
the forerunner statutes, intending the new statute to be interpreted
likewise.273 Therefore, the legislative history is consistent with the
plain meaning of the statute, indicating § 284 means exactly what it
says; that is, the jury does not determine the amount of the increased
damages.2 74

266. See Act of Apr. 17, 1800, ch. 25, § 3, 2 Stat. at 38.
267. See Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 14, 5 Stat. at 123.
268. Compare Act of Apr. 17, 1800, ch. 25, § 3, 2 Stat. at 38, with Act of July 4,
1836, ch. 357, § 14, 5 Stat. at 123.
269. See Seymour v. McCormick, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 480, 489 (1853).
In order to obviate this injustice, the patent act of 1836 confines the jury to
the assessment of 'actual damages.' The power to inflict vindictive or punitive damages is committed to the discretion and judgment of the court within
the limit of trebling the actual damages found by the jury.
Id. (emphasis added).
270. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 59, 16 Stat. 198, 207, repealed by Patent Act of
1952, ch. 950 § 284, 66 Stat. 792, 815; see also Brown v. Lanyon, 148 F. 838, 838-39
(8th Cir. 1906). Comparing the Patent Act of 1836 with the Patent Act of 1870, the
Eighth Circuit stated:
[T]he damages recoverable in an action at law for the infringement of a patent remained practically as before, namely, actual damages sustained as
found by the verdict of the jury, with power in the court to increase the same
not exceeding three times the amount of the verdict, according to the circumstances of the case.
Id. at 838-39 (emphasis added).
271. Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, § 284, 66 Stat. 792, 813 (current version at 35
U.S.C. § 284).
272. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 284, with Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, § 284, 66 Stat. at
813, and Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 59, 16 Stat. at 207. See also Powers & Carlson,
supra note 36, at 66, for further discussion of the similarities between the statutes.
273. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 581 (1978) ("[W]here ... Congress adopts a
new law incorporating sections of a prior law, Congress normally can be presumed to
have had knowledge of the interpretation given to the incorporated law, at least insofar as it affects the new statute.").
274. See 35 U.S.C. § 284.
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Federal Court Interpretation

1. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
The Federal Circuit's interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 284 is another
example of why there is no right to a jury determination on the
amount of increased damages. Federal Circuit opinions consistently
refer to the determination of the amount of increased damages as reserved for the discretion of the "trial court, 2 7 5 "district court, 2 76 or
"trial judge." 277 Do these terms mean the same thing? It seems clear
that these terms do not refer to the jury because in each Federal Circuit opinion, the jury is referred to separately as the "jury. '2 78 Thus,
the jury is considered a distinct entity from any of these three
terms.2 79 Consequently, if the terms do not refer to the jury, then the
terms must be equivalent and refer to the trial judge.
There are many common law examples of the substitution of the
word "court" for "trial judge." In Modine Manufacturing, "trial
judge" and "district court" are expressly equivalent, with the court
stating that "[t]he decision to increase damages is committed to the
discretion of the trialjudge and a district court's refusal to award increased damages will not be overturned absent a clear showing of
abuse of discretion. ' 280 Also, in National Presto Industries, Inc. v.
West Bend Co.,28 1 the court stated that "[e]nhancement of damages in
a patent infringement case is a discretionary ruling of the trial court; it
is reviewed with requisite deference to the discretion of the trial
judge. ' 28 2 Additional Federal Circuit opinions have also used these
terms interchangeably. 28 3 The above examples show that the Federal
Circuit has recognized that the trial judge determines the amount of
increased damages, not the jury.
In addition to the expressed recognition that the trial judge is to
determine damages, a great majority of the Federal Circuit opinions
275. See, e.g., Acoustical Design, Inc. v. Control Elecs. Co., 932 F.2d 939, 942 (Fed.
Cir. 1991).
276. See, e.g., Electro Scientific Indus., Inc. v. Gen. Scanning, Inc., 247 F.3d 1341,
1353-54 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Nat'l Presto Indus., Inc. v. W. Bend Co., 76 F.3d 1185,
1193-94 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
277. See, e.g., Nat'l Presto Indus., 76 F.3d at 1193.
278. See, e.g., Electro Scientific Indus., 247 F.3d at 1353-54; Nat'l Presto Indus., 76
F.3d at 1192-93; Acoustical Design, 932 F.2d at 942.
279. See, e.g., Electro Scientific Indus., 247 F.3d at 1353-54.
280. See Modine Mfg. Co. v. Allen Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 538, 543 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(emphasis added) (citing Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 819 F.2d 1120, 1126 (Fed. Cir.
1987)).
281. 76 F.3d 1185 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
282. Id. at 1193 (emphasis added) (citing Datascope Corp. v. SMEC, Inc., 879 F.2d
820, 823-24 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
283. See, e.g., Sofamor Danek Group, Inc. v. DePuy-Motech, Inc., 74 F.3d 1216,
1221 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Registration Control Sys., Inc. v. Compusystems, Inc., 922 F.2d
805, 809 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. LKB Produkter AB, 892 F.2d
1547, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
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also implicitly recognize this interpretation. In Part V above, the
cases cited only discuss the impact of the jury's finding of willfulnesswhether it is advisory or whether it is required-and not whether the
jury should determine the amount of increased damages. The absence
of this issue from those opinions could be viewed as an implicit recog-

nition that the trial judge determines this issue, especially when
viewed in light of Federal Circuit opinions that expressly recognize
this scheme.284
2.

The United States Supreme Court and Feltner v. Columbia
Pictures Television, Inc.

The Supreme Court has not yet interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 284 with
regard to the functions of the jury and the trial judge in the determination of the amount of increased damages.285 This is another indicator
that the issue has been settled by the Federal Circuit. However, the
Supreme Court has interpreted the statute's forerunner, the Patent
Act of 1836, which contains language substantially equivalent to

§ 284.286 In Seymour v. McCormick,2 8 7 the Court stated that "the patent act of 1836 confines the jury to the assessment of 'actual damages.'
The power to inflict vindictive or punitive damages is committed to

the discretion and judgment of the court
within the limit of trebling
288
the actual damages found by the jury.
Possibly the strongest objection to the trial judge determining the
amount of increased damages is based on the Supreme Court's decision in Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc. 289 In Feltner, the
Supreme Court held that a petitioner in a copyright case had a Sev-

enth Amendment right to a jury trial on the amount of statutory dam284. Compare cases cited supra notes 158-61, 185-88, 196, 242, 245, with cases cited
supra notes 275-83.
285. United States Supreme Court cases citing 35 U.S.C. § 284 are: Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 648
n.11 (1999); BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 581 n.33 (1996);
GeneralMotors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648 passim (1983); City of Lafayette v.
LouisianaPower & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 440 n.30 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting);
Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 522 (1972); and Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 504-05 (1964).
286. Compare supra note 222 and accompanying text, with supra note 20 and accompanying text.
287. 57 U.S. (16 How.) 480 (1853).
288. Id. at 489. This rule was also expressed in 1921 when the Seventh Circuit considered increased damages in a court of equity. Filer & Stowell Co. v. Diamond Iron
Works, 270 F. 489, 490 (7th Cir. 1921).
[A]ctions arising under the patent laws are made cognizable in courts of equity, and the court is given power upon bill filed to grant injunctions according to the principles of equity, and upon finding infringement, to award the
plaintiff profits and damages, with same power to the court of equity to increase damages as is provided in cases of damages found by verdicts of juries
at law.
Id. (emphasis added).
289. See 523 U.S. 340, 353-55 (1998).
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ages.2 9 ° The copyright damages statute, 17 U.S.C. § 504, allows statutory damages to be awarded instead of actual damages.2 9 ' In addition, if willful copyright infringement is found, the amount of statutory
damages may be increased.2 92 In § 504(c), only the word "court" is
used to designate the body that finds both willful copyright infringement, and determines the amount of statutory damages, which includes possessing the discretion to award a statutory damage amount
above the actual damage level.29 3
of
In Feltner, the Court commented, but did not hold, that the use 294
the word "court" in the statute "appears to mean judge, not jury.
The Court then went on to consider the constitutional question, and
held that under the Seventh Amendment, there was the constitutional
right to a jury trial on the amount of statutory damages, including statutory damage amounts above actual damages. 2 95 In contrast to the
majority, Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion, stated that the constitutional question could have been avoided because the word
"court" can have a "broader meaning, which includes both judge and
jury. ' 2 96 Because both the majority and concurring opinions of Feltner associated the jury with the word "court" under 17 U.S.C.
§ 504(c)(2), Feltner could be used to suggest that the jury should determine the amount of increased damages under 35 U.S.C. § 284.297
However, Feltner does not support this argument for primarily three
reasons. First, Feltner interprets the copyright damages statute instead
of the patent damages statute.2 9 8 Second, in addition to their application to different bodies of law, the language of each statute is signifi290. Id. at 355.
291. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2000) ("Except as provided by clause (2) of this subsection, the copyright owner may elect, at any time before final judgment is rendered, to
recover, instead of actual damages and profits, an award of statutory damages for all
infringements involved in the action ....").
292. Id. § 504(c)(2) ("In a case where the copyright owner sustains the burden of
proving, and the court finds, that infringement was committed willfully, the court in
its discretion may increase the award of statutory damages to a sum of not more than

$150,000.").
293. See
294. See
295. See
determine
owner.").
296. See

id. § 504(c).
Feltner, 523 U.S. at 346.
id. at 353-55 ("The right to a jury trial includes the right to have a jury
the amount of statutory damages, if any, awarded to the copyright
id. at 356 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing

NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 522
LAW DICTIONARY 318 (5th ed. 1979)).

WEBSTER'S THIRD

(Philip Babcock Grove ed. 1993);

BLACK'S

297. See, e.g., Wu, supra note 24, at 452-53 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 504(c); 35 U.S.C.

§ 284 (2000)).
298. See Feltner, 523 U.S. at 353, 355; 17 U.S.C. § 504; 35 U.S.C. § 284. See generally ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 21-28 (2d ed. 2000) (giving an overview and summary table comparing and
distinguishing the different modes of intellectual property protection, including copyrights and patents).
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cantly different from the other.2 99 The copyright damages statute only
uses the word "court" to label the entity that makes all pertinent determinations.3 °° In contrast, the patent damages statute specifically
provides that either the "court" or the "jury" determines the amount
of actual damages, and further provides that only the "court may increase the damages up to three times the amount found or
assessed. "301
Third, Feltner is inapplicable because American statutory law and
common law, from 1836 to the present, have both consistently granted
the trial judge discretion to determine the amount of increased damages.30 2 To hold that the jury should determine the amount of increased damages in a patent infringement suit, the Supreme Court
would be required to overrule itself and over 100 years of consistent
statutory patent law and common law precedent.30 3 Therefore, even
in light of Feltner, the trial judge is to determine the amount of increased damages in patent infringement suits.
C. Inapplicability of the Historical Test Due to Statutory Preclusion
Notwithstanding the above statutory interpretation and review of
Federal Circuit opinions holding that the jury is precluded from determining the amount of increased damages, a cursory application of the
historical test could lead one to the conclusion that the right to a jury
determination of the amount of increased damages does exist because
patent infringement suits must be tried to a jury upon request.30 4 Additionally, although increased damages for willful patent infringement
did not exist at English common law in 1791, the analogous practice of
awarding punitive damages did exist. In 1791 England, the jury determined both whether to award punitive damages and the amount of the
punitive award.30 5 Although these results establish that the right to a
jury trial exists for a determination of willfulness-whether to award
actual damages 3 06-they cannot be used to establish that the jury right
exists for a determination of the amount of increased damages because the statute precludes this jury determination.30 7
Furthermore, Congress had the ability to avoid the Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial through a variety of means, such as:
(1) assigning state courts as the forum for enforcement of federally
299. See supra notes 20, 291-93 and accompanying text (providing each statute's
relevant language).
300. See supra note 293.

301. See 35 U.S.C. § 284.
302. See supra notes 255-83 and accompanying text.
303. See supra notes 255-83 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Seymour v. McCormick, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 480, 490 (1853).
304. See supra Part IV.B.1.
305. See supra Part IV.B.2.c.
306. See supra Part IV.B.2.c.
307. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000).
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created rights;3" 8 (2) creating fact-finding agencies within the Execu309
tive Branch for the purpose of enforcing federally created rights;
and (3) authorizing the Executive Branch to enforce "public rights"
by bringing civil suits in non-jury trials.3 10 In addition to these com-

mon devices, Congress can also expressly preclude civil juries by statto the
ute, as long as the "preclusion of the jury trial is not offensive
31 1
considerations that gave rise to the Seventh Amendment.
An example of Congressional preclusion is found in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,3 12 which involved, inter alia, the awarding of
backpay resulting from violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

of 1964. 313 The Supreme Court stated that Congress's statutory
scheme, giving the judge discretion over whether to award backpay as
a remedy for unlawful discrimination, made the remedy equitable in

nature.314 In addition, the Court noted the Senate's rejection of an
amendment that would have required actions involving backpay to be
tried before a jury.3 15
In his concurring opinion, Justice Rehnquist further addressed the
right to a jury trial on backpay.31 6 Justice Rehnquist stated that a
backpay award was equitable in nature because the "District Court

[that is, the trial judge,] retains substantial discretion as to whether or
not to award backpay notwithstanding a finding of unlawful discrimi-

'
Therefore, he found no right to a jury trial on backpay.318
nation."317
However, if a backpay award was required after a finding of unlawful

discrimination, then the backpay amount would cease to be equitable,
and "would quite
arguably be subject to the provisions of the Seventh
3 19
Amendment.
Similar to the statute discussed in Albemarle, and as discussed
above, Congress has reserved in § 284 the determination of the
308. Paul D. Carrington, The Seventh Amendment: Some Bicentennial Reflections,
1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 33, 42-43 (citing Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92-93 (1876);
Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R., 342 U.S. 359, 362-63 (1952)).
309. See id. at 77 (citing Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 450 (1977); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1, 48-49 (1937)).
310. Id. at 78 (citing Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 65-69 (1989)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Crowell v. Benson, 285
U.S. 22, 50-51 (1932); Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59
U.S. (18 How.) 272, 283-84 (1856)).
311. See id. at 82 (citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 419-21
(1975); Note, CongressionalProvision for Nonjury Trial Under the Seventh Amendment, 83 YALE L.J. 401 (1973)).
312. See 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
313. See id. at 408.
314. See id. at 416.
315. Id. at 420 n.13.
316. See id. at 442-43 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
317. See id. at 443 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
318. See id. (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
319. See id. (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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amount of increased damages to the discretion of the trial judge and
not to the jury-precluding the jury from determining this issue and
making increased damage awards equitable in nature. 320 Furthermore, with respect to Justice Rehnquist's concurring opinion, the parallel is even sharper. Just as a finding of unlawful discrimination in
Albemarle did not mandate backpay, increased damages do not follow
automatically after a finding of willfulness in patent infringement
suits. Both backpay award amounts for unlawful discrimination and
increased damage award amounts for patent infringement remain
within the trial judge's discretion and are equitable in nature. Because there is no right to a jury trial with regard to causes of action
that are equitable in nature,3 21 the statutory preclusion of the jury
does not conflict with the Seventh Amendment.
The Congressional preclusion of the jury from increasing damages
in § 284 makes the historical test inapplicable. The test may not be
used, because according to statutory interpretation and the Federal
Circuit, the determination of the amount of increased damages is a
task for the trial judge and not the jury. Therefore, there is no right to
a jury trial on the amount of increased damages.
VII.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The analysis results and accompanying discussion above support
three recommendations. The first recommendation is, because the
right to a jury trial on willfulness exists, that the Federal Circuit
should expressly recognize this right at the next appropriate opportunity. Expressed recognition is preferable for two reasons. First, it appears to be the law.3 22 And second, commentators and courts have
rejected the right.3 23 Although attack on this right is inconsistent with
the Seventh Amendment and Federal Circuit precedent, district
courts and possibly the Federal Circuit may begin to frown upon or
even reject the right.
The second recommendation is that the Federal Circuit should expressly hold that there is no right to a jury trial on the amount of
increased damages. This issue is not as critical as the issue on willfulness because there does not appear to be any conflict over this issue in
320. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000).
321. See Gary D. Spivey, Annotation, Right to Jury Trial in Patent Infringement
Action in Federal Court, 18 A.L.R. FED. § 3, at 690, 697-98 (1974).
322. See supra Parts IV, V.
323. See Transmatic, Inc. v. Gulton Indus., Inc., 835 F. Supp. 1026, 1032 (E.D. Mich.
1993) ("[Willfulness] is not a matter in which the Plaintiff has a Seventh Amendment
right to a jury trial."), affd in part, rev'd in part, 53 F.3d 1270 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Avia
Group Int'l v. Nike, Inc., 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1475, 1477 (D. Or. 1991) ("[Tjhere is
no constitutional right to a jury trial on issues under... § 284 ..
"); Pegram, supra
note 57, at 359 ("There is no right to jury trial of willfulness, although dicta may have
suggested the contrary.").
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the courts or literature. 324 Nevertheless, such a holding would be
preferable for two reasons. First, it also appears to be the law. 325 And
second, if the right to a jury trial on willfulness was expressly recognized by the Federal Circuit, the issue of a related right on the amount
of increased damages would probably also be raised-especially in
light of Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc. ,326 where the Supreme Court held that there is a right to a jury trial on the amount of
statutory damages in copyright infringement suits. 32 7 Rather than
leave this issue open to different interpretations based on Feltner, it
would be appropriate to hold that there is no right to a jury trial on
the amount of the increase even when holding that there is the right to
a jury trial on willfulness.
The third recommendation is that solutions to the judicial problems
related to willful patent infringement must be approached with the
expressed recognition that there is the right to a jury trial on willfulness. When coupled with the affirmative duty and negative inference
rules, the adverse effect of the jury's willfulness determination on the
attorney-client privilege and attorney work-product immunity are
very real and have been expressly recognized by the courts.32 8
Commentators have suggested several acceptable solutions to these
problems, including: (1) bifurcating the trial into infringement liability
and willful infringement liability phases; 329 (2) establishing privilege
waiver guidelines;3 3 ° and (3) abandoning the affirmative duty and negative inference rules.33 ' In addition, solutions have been presented
that call for the trial judge to determine willfulness, entirely precluding the jury from the issue.33 2 Solutions that take willfulness away
from the jury appear to be contrary to both the Constitution and existing common law.333
Justice Rehnquist stated that "[t]he guarantees of the Seventh
Amendment will prove burdensome in some instances .... But... the
324. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
325. See supra Part VI.
326. 523 U.S. 340 (1998).
327. See id. at 355.
328. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
329. See, e.g., 7 CHISUM, supra note 22, § 20.03[4][b][v], at 20-436; Dunner &
Rainey, supra note 57, at 229; Pegram, supra note 57, at 358; Sirilla et al., supra note
51, at 394-95.
330. See Powers & Carlson, supra note 36, at 108-09.
331. See id. at 108; see also Dunner & Rainey, supra note 57, at 300 (discussing
negative inference).
332. See Littman, supra note 14, at 253 ("There appears to be no reason why the
issue of willful infringement should be submitted to the jury."); Pegram, supra note
57, at 359 ("[A]n accused infringer ... need not voluntarily accept trial of willfulness
by the jury .... The rules concerning separate trials and avoidance of prejudice permit, and may even require, a court to keep the willfulness issue from the jury.") (citations omitted); Powers & Carlson, supra note 36, at 109-12 ("There are sound reasons
for reserving matters of willfulness to the court [as opposed to the jury].").
333. See supra Parts IV, V.
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onerous nature of the protection is no license for contracting the
rights secured by the Amendment.

' 334

This principle should be ap-

plied here. As long as willfulness remains the basis for an award of
increased damages, solutions to the conflicts between a jury finding on
willfulness and other rules must be designed so that the constitutional
right to a jury trial on the issue is not abrogated but expressly acknowledged and incorporated into the overall solution design.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

As long as a finding of willfulness is required before an increased
damage award can be made, the Seventh Amendment right to a jury
trial on willfulness exists. 33 5 Furthermore the results of the Markman
version of the historical test show that the right does exist.3 36 Additionally, patent infringement suits must be tried to a jury upon request.33 7 Although increased damages for willful patent infringement
did not exist at English common law in 1791, the analogous practice of
awarding punitive damages did exist.338 In 1791 England, the jury determined whether to award punitive damages.3 3 9 Thus, the historical
test proves that the Seventh Amendment preserves the right to a jury
trial on willfulness. This right is also implicitly recognized by the Federal Circuit on three grounds: (1) Jury findings on willfulness are nonadvisory; 340 (2) In a jury trial, determining willfulness has been explicitly and implicitly recognized as a role for the jury;34 1 and (3) At least
one opinion has recognized that there is the "right" to such a jury
342
determination.

However, there is no right to a jury trial on the amount of increased
damages.34 3 35 U.S.C. § 284 gives the trial judge the discretion to determine the amount of increased damages to award.3 44 The statute's
language and its legislative history support this interpretation. 345
Also, Federal Circuit and Supreme Court precedent are consistent
with this interpretation.3 4 6 Because this Congressional grant of discretion to the trial judge makes increased damages equitable in nature,
334. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 346 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
335. See supra Part IV.A.
336. See supra Part IV.B.
337. See supra Part IV.B.2.
338. See supra Part IV.B.2.a.
339. See supra Part IV.B.2.c.
340. See supra Part V.A.
341. See supra Part V.B.
342. See supra Part V.C.
343. See supra Part VI.
344. See supra Part VI.A.
345. See supra Part VI.A.
346. See supra Part V.B.
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the Seventh Amendment does not provide the right to a jury trial on
the amount of increased damages.3 47
Therefore, the Federal Circuit should expressly hold that the right
to a jury trial on willfulness exists, but that no such right exists on the
determination of the amount of increased damages. In the interest of
preserving the attorney-client privilege and maintaining attorney
work-product immunity, the resolving of conflicts with the affirmative
duty and negative inference rules must be approached with the express recognition that there is the right to a jury trial on willfulness.
Alan N. Herda
347. See supra Part VI.C.
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